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YOU'VE TAKEN AN OATH TO SUPPORT THE
CONSTITUTION, NOW WHAT? THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT FOR A CONGRESSIONAL OATH OF OFFICE
Vic Snyder*
January 7, 1997, was a raucous day on the floor of the United
States House of Representatives. Representative Newt Gingrich's re-
election as Speaker was not at all a sure thing, even though his
Republican Party had retained control of the House. The floor of the
House had the feel of a Jacksonian inauguration day: babies crying,
kids playing, the temperature rising as the hot lights for television
cameras heated up the atmosphere of an interior world that usually is
a cool, cavernous chamber. As the roll call proceeded through the 435
members, each rose upon hearing his or her name and announced a
choice for Speaker. None of the spectators left, but they stayed not out
of interest in the Speaker's race. The kids, parents, husbands and
wives, friends, and supporters sat through the laborious vote to see their
special friend or loved one take the oath of office as a member of the
United States House of Representatives; that oath had to be adminis-
tered by the new or newly re-elected Speaker.
Taking the oath of office is special. Being on the House floor for
the first time as a new member of the people's house in the world's
greatest democracy is special. For me and my freshmen colleagues,
that day is unforgettable, and continues to be upon re-election every
two years; but the pace of events and the excitement on swearing-in
day does not allow for much reflection on what the oath of office
means, where it came from, and what effect, if any, it should have on
future behavior of members of Congress. Granted, the oath serves one
practical function: if you do not take the oath of office, you do not get
paid. If for some reason a member is unable to take the oath of office
at the beginning of the term, such as for medical reasons, once the oath
is administered, the member is paid from the beginning of the term of
office.' But only the most hardened cynic would believe that the
formal recitation of the following words would elicit such excitement
merely because they ensure a paycheck:
* Vic Snyder is a third term member of Congress from the Second District of
Arkansas. a family doctor, and a 1988 graduate of the University of Arkansas at Little
Rock School of Law.
I. See 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 406, 408 (1875) (reprinting Attorney General opinion
of June 6, 1874. which stated that a person elected to the House of Representatives
becomes a representative only upon taking the oath of office).
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I, A B, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that
I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the
duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.
2
Those are the words that I proudly and respectfully repeated that
particularly rowdy January day. But they are not the words that
triggered this inquiry. The oath of office is administered because of a
constitutional requirement contained in Article VI, Clause 3:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution;
but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States.'
"To support this Constitution." What does that mean? And how is that
consistent with the prolific output that members of Congress have had
in introducing over ten thousand proposed amendments to the Constitu-
tion?" And not even a constitutional demand that elected officials
faithfully perform their duties, only that they "support this Constitu-
tion." During the 1998 campaign, the National Taxpayers Union
("NTU") distributed the 1998 National Taxpayers Union Poll of
Congressional Candidates. Of the eight questions asked, four were
inquiries regarding whether the candidate would support a constitu-
tional amendment, specifically the Balanced Budget Amendment, the
Tax Limitation Amendment, the Taxpayer Protection Amendment, and
Major Constitutional Tax Reform. 5  The NTU has every right to
support any and as many amendments as they desire, and any member
of Congress has the right to do the same; but does the oath to "support
this Constitution" affect the member's deliberation that occurs in
consideration of these amendments? Should it? During the 105th
Congress, of which I was a member, on February 12, 1997, a series of
2. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1994).
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
4. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, On Amending the Constitution: A Plea for Patience, 12
U. ARK. LnrrLE ROCK L.J. 677. 679 (1990).
5. See Letter from Al Cors, Jr., Vice President for Government Affairs, Nat'l
Taxpayers Union. to Vic Snyder. United States Representative (May 29. 1998) (on file
with author).
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votes occurred on various term limit amendment proposals. Nine states
had passed state ballot initiatives requiring their members of Congress
to support a specific variation, specifying that if a member from that
state's congressional delegation did not support that specific version,
a notation that the member had not followed the instructions of the
voters would be placed by his name on the ballot at the next election.
A rule for the debate was constructed that allowed each of the nine
states to have their proposals come to the floor for brief debate and a
vote even though the members knew there was only minimal support
for any of these measures; each was overwhelmingly defeated.6 Does
such a rule of debate trivialize the process of amending the Constitution
such that it is inconsistent with a pledge to "support this Constitution"?
Or is it the kind of political debate the framers expected out of a lively
American democracy?7 Such events were a motivation to learn more
about the constitutional requirement to "support this Constitution," and
while such musings might seem removed from the reality of today's
American political life, at least one motivated citizen does not think so.
An anonymous fax recently arrived in my office in support of Senator
John Ashcroft for Attorney General. It concluded, "ENOUGH IS
ENOUGH! REMEMBER YOUR OATH TO THE CONSTITUTION
OR BE REMEMBERED A TRAITOR."8  While constitutional
journeys never arrive at the end of the road, what follows is some of the
landscape seen on my personal exploration of remembrance.
I. THE PRESIDENT AND THEJUDGES
In contrast to the undefined congressional oath, the concluding
sentence of Article i, Section I specifies the exact wording of the oath
of office for the President:
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States,
and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States."9
6. 143 CONG. REC. H458-512 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1997).
7. SeeCookv. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510(2001).
8. See Facsimile from Anonymous Sender to Vic Snyder. United States
Representative (Jan. 30, 2001) (on file with author).
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I. cl. 8.
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Matthew A. Pauley, in I Do Solemnly Swear, The President's Constitutional
Oath. Its Meaning and Importance in the History of Oaths, thoroughly
examines the presidential oath and notes Chief Justice Warren Burger's
observation that the framers placed great importance on this exact
choice of language. "The Constitution stipulates in very precise
language what the President must pledge."'0  The differences in
constitutional treatment are substantial, evincing the framers' desire
that the respective office holders view their obligations differently.
And while the language of the congressional oath is not prescribed and
the President's job responsibilities are more extensive, the one
requirement for members of Congress is very clearly laid out: constitu-
tional support. But Pauley's main theme is that the presidential oath
requirement is very important. In his concluding paragraph he
expresses how important:
The prescribed oath can be ...a vital restraint on our Presidents
even when, as in the case of Lincoln, they are constrained by reasons
of state to apply Caesarian remedies. It is a self-restraint, to be sure,
but a restraint certainly as important as the impeachment or the
threat of electoral defeat."
The constitutional requirement for federal judges is contained in
the Article VI, Clause 3 language of the Constitution, and the signifi-
cance and power of that oath was made clear in Marbury v. Madison.2
Marbury established the power of the federal judiciary to ultimately
determine whether laws or actions are consistent with the language of
what was then a relatively new Constitution:
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it?
This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct
in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if
they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instru-
ments, for violating what they swear to support! 13
10. MATTHEW A. PAULEY. I Do SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
OATH 3 (1999) (quoting Warren Burger, A Republic If You Can Keep It. The Harry
Sievers Memorial Lecture at Fordham University School of Law (Jan. 28, 1988)).
II. Id. at 243.
12. 5U.S.(I Cranch) 137, 180(1803).
13. Id. See also Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 339 (Pa. 1825)" SANFORD
LEVINSON, CONSTUTIONAL FArI 92-93 (1988).
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This power of the judicial oath of office is articulated as well by
modern-era judges. Said Earl Warren, "We are oath-bound to defend
the Constitution."'
' 4
A presidential oath that is as important an influence over presiden-
tial behavior as the threat of election defeat or impeachment, according
to Pauley, and a judicial oath that in Marbury v. Madison shaped the
power of the federal judiciary are tough competition for the legislative
branch mass oath of 435 House members in a rowdy Capitol chamber.
11. THE CEREMONY
Family and friends waited the day of my first swearing in, which
was in January 1997. It was not until a speaker was elected and sworn
in that members of the House would take the oath, as the Speaker was
the one who would administer the oath. Once Representative Newt
Gingrich was elected Speaker, Representative John Dingell, the longest
serving member in the House, administered the oath of office to the
Speaker. None of this ceremony is contained in the Constitution, and
in fact, with the exception of the wording of the Presidential oath, none
of the ceremony associated with the inauguration of a President is
contained in the Constitution either, not even the presence of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. 5 Yet the formality can be important. De
Tocqueville talks of the importance in democratic societies of formali-
ties, but acknowledges that democratic societies resist such ceremony.'6
Sanford Levinson, in one of his discussions of loyalty oaths, notes the
importance of the formality of an oath: "Their formal nature may
remind one of the 'contentless' seals once thought necessary to give
legal validity to contracts.' 7  The argument has been made that the
defined wording of the presidential oath relegates that oath to one of
mere ceremony because there is no authority for the legislative branch
to freshen it up as circumstances and the demands on our chief
executive change,"8 but Pauley rejects that idea if for no other reason
than the formality of it is a reminder of the importance of the duties and
14. PAULEY. supra note 10, at 189.
15. Seeid at 223.
16. See id. at 242.
17. Sanford Levinson, Constituting Communities Through Words That Bind: Reflections
on Loyalty Oaths, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1440, 1447 (1986).
18. See PAULEY. supra note 10, at 199, 201 (quoting EDWARD DUMBAULD. THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 275-76 (1964)).
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the office. 9 Certainly the administration of the congressional oath also
imparts a formal reminder of the importance of the office, even though
administered to 434 members as a group. The Senate augments the
potential benefit of the formal oath-taking by administering the oath to
four new members at a time, and repeats the formal oath administration
until all the new members have taken the oath. If one were to accept
the argument that the precise wording reduces the importance of the
presidential oath, one could argue that the absence of precise wording
for the congressional oath enables Congress to maintain the relevance
and power of the oath by updating it statutorily as circumstances
change."0 While I do not agree with that argument, the congressional
oath required by Article VI, Clause 3, is not the same oath today as first
legislated in 1789, and the history begins before the American
Revolution and extends beyond the Civil War.
Ill. THE HISTORY
American colonists from England brought with them a recollection
of oath requirements to hold office, and the history was not always a
good one. Contained in Huntamer v. Coe is the following summary:
The abuse of oaths of allegiance seems to have centered around two
things: (a) oaths designed to disqualify from office individuals of a
particular religious belief or association; and (b) oaths designed to
disqualify individuals from office because of past conduct, usually
involving past political beliefs or activities. In England, the oath of
supremacy, required under a statute enacted in the year 1562, made
it necessary for members of the House of Commons to swear that the
queen was supreme in spiritual as well as temporal causes, and that
no foreign person or potentate had any authority, ecclesiastical or
spiritual, within the realm. In 1609, a requirement was added to the
effect that the king was lawfully king, and that the pope had no
power to depose him. The final result of this legislation and the
oaths required thereby was that both houses of Parliament for some
time were effectually closed to members of the Roman Catholic
Church.2
With this legacy it is not surprising to see the Article VI, Clause 3 oath
requirement immediately followed by the language "but no religious
19. See id. at 207.
20. See id. at 201.
21. Huntamner v. Coe, 246 P.2d 489, 492-93 (Wash. 1952): see also Imbrie v.
Marsh, 71 A.2d 352, 357 (N.J. 1950).
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Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public
Trust under the United States."22  And because expressions of loyalty
to royalty had no place in the new American union, the framers
replaced an oath such as "I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to
King William and Queen Mary" 3 with an expression of support for the
new United States Constitution. But these decisions by the framers
were a century away, and the American colonies had their own oath
history yet to come, a history that also demonstrated the potential abuse
of loyalty oaths, including oaths of office.
Harold M. Hyman's book, To Try Men's Souls: Loyalty Tests in
American History, reviews the American experience with loyalty oaths
beginning with the colonial period.24  Oaths were important to the
colonies from the earliest days of settlement. The first printing press
in the English-speaking colonies in Boston began production by
printing as its first item a loyalty oath,25 and Roger Williams was one
colonialist who could not tolerate the Massachusetts colonial oath.26
The use of loyalty oaths sometimes produced chaos. In Maryland, in
1689, two different governments expected to govern and wanted the
undiluted loyalty of the colonists.2 The result: "Confusion reigned in
Maryland. Political murders became common; offices remained vacant
for want of men willing to take a partisan plunge by swearing loyalty
to one side or the other."28 But for the most part, formal professions of
loyalty to royalty became a routine that colonials performed to achieve
some goal, even colonials destined to become future revolutionaries.
Benjamin Franklin and George Washington held government positions
after swearing the royal oath, Franklin as a postal employee and
Washington as an officer in the militia.2
Dissatisfaction with the king's taxation and economic policies
prompted organized efforts by local Whig committees, led by men such
as John Hancock, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and Sam Adams,
to boycott British imports.30 The First Continental Congress met in
1774, still professing loyalty to the king but focusing on the rights of
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
23. Imbrie, 71 A.2d at 357.
24. See generally HAROLD M. HYMAN, To TRY MEN'S SouLs, LOYALTY TESTS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1981).
25. See HYMAN, supra note 24, at 15; Levinson, supra note 17. at 1449.
26. See LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 100.
27. See HYMAN, supra note 24, at 29.
28. Id. at 30.
29. See id. at 60.
30. See id. at 63.
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colonials. A uniform boycott regulation was adopted that in effect was
the first standard loyalty test in America. Because the Continental
Congress had no enforcement power, the end was accomplished by
physical fear and social and economic pressure; the resulting success
nurtured the Whig organization throughout the colonies.' The
initiation of armed conflict at Lexington and Concord in 1775 increased
the colonial enthusiasm for aggressive enforcement of the boycott,
2
although enforcement varied from colony to colony." George Washing-
ton's Chief Surgeon was found to be a traitor to the colonial cause, but
legal action for traitorous actions was difficult when the colonial
organizations were still formally professing loyalty to the crown. 4
Washington became convinced that a recrudescence of loyalty to the
crown could be curtailed by enforcement of loyalty oaths, as evidenced
by this December 1775 writing:
I think as you do that it is high time a test act was prepared and
every man called upon to declare himself; that we may distinguish
friends from foes; nor have I any idea of a set of men being exempt
from the common duties of society in any country, or community
where they have been fostered in the sweet enjoyment of its
liberties."
But even with the Continental Army in the enforcement business,
obtaining a statement of loyalty from a Tory did not necessarily
guarantee true allegiance.36  The Continental Congress took the
enforcement function away from Washington's army and left it with
state assemblies and local committees,3 but yet another treason case
pushed the Continental Congress to act. In June 1776, the Continental
Congress declared that Americans owed allegiance to the colony in
which they lived, not to the crown, and that treason should be enforced
accordingly; not a great step away from a July 4, 1776, Declaration of
Independence.38 Professions of loyalty, now to the Declaration of
Independence, continued to be sought by Washington and the newly
31. See id. at 64-66.
32. See id at 70.
33. See HYMAN. supra note 24, at 72.
34. See id. at 73-74.
35. Id. at 74.
36. See id. at 75.
37. See id. at 76-77.
38. See id. at 77-78.
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independent America,39 but soon became primarily.a local function.'
While the Continental Congress was content to let local enforcement
handle any disloyalty from private citizens, allegiance from federal
officials was a different manner. In February 1778, the Continental
Congress adopted an oath for federal officers, both military and
civilian:
I __ do acknowledge the United States of America to be free,
independent and sovereign states, and declare the people thereof owe
no allegiance or obedience to George the 3d, King of Great Britain;
and I renounce, refuse and abjure any allegiance or obedience to
him; and I do swear (or affirm) that I will, to the utmost of my
power, support, maintain, and defend the said United States against
the said King George 3d and his heirs and successors, and his and
their abettors, assistants and adherents, and I will serve the said
United States in the office of which I now hold, with
fidelity, according to the best of my skill and understanding. So help
me God.4
Lofty words that left no doubt as to the intent of the oath-taker, if
sincere, but the majority of traitors, including Benedict Arnold, signed
the oath.42 British authorities, in their efforts to obtain statements of
loyalty to the crown, had similar unsatisfactory experiences.4 Under
the Articles of Confederation enthusiasm for loyalty oaths and for
punishment of Tories waned." Hyman summarizes the American
experience with loyalty oaths: "in the United States as in England, men
had learned to disbelieve the efficacy of enforced loyalty tests as valid
guides to future good conduct."'
Hyman concludes that the unreliability of loyalty oaths and the
colonial experience with them led the framers to a minimal oath
requirement in the Constitution. "The Constitution of 1787 finally
contained a provision specifying a mere oath of office for the President,
and a provision requiring an unspecified oath for federal and state
officers." Pauley takes issue with Hyman's dismissive treatment of
the Article VI, Clause 3 oath requirement and points out that Hyman's
39. See HYMAN. supra note 24. at 80.
40. See id. at 82.
41. Id. at 82-83.
42. See id. at 83-84.
43. See id. at 109.
44. See id. at 1]3-14.




work focuses on loyalty oaths, not oaths of office."7 Despite the painful
history with loyalty oaths, the framers placed importance on an oath of
office requirement for both the President and state and federal officials,
either because they distinguished an oath of office from a general
loyalty oath or because oaths of office were valuable enough to be
included as a constitutional requirement, despite the colonial experi-
ence. Levinson, in his book Constitutional Faith, reaches a different
conclusion than Hyman:
Whether because of the Protestant background of colonial America
or not, the framers of the Constitution took immense care to require
oaths of allegiance as part of a sound framework of government.
Although the Constitution is often praised for its relative spare-
ness-John Marshall described it as consisting more of "great
outlines" and "important objects" than as "an accurate detail of all
the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit"-it is striking
that the authors of the 1787 document twice saw fit to write in
requirements of oath-taking by governmental officials.48
The framers' debate is limited but reflects the colonial difficulties with
oaths. From the Journal of the Constitutional Convention: "Mr.
Wilson said he was never fond of oaths, considering them as a left
handed security only. A good Gov['t] did not need them, and a bad
one could not or ought not to be supported." 49 What debate that is
recorded mostly deals with the relationship between the state and
federal government."0 The resulting constitutional language mandating
an oath of office for members of Congress was fulfilled by the first act
of Congress under the new Constitution in 1789. "1, A.B., do solemnly
swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution
of the United States."5'
The subsequent upheaval of the Civil War produced changes in the
oath of office. On July 2, 1862, new and more complicated language
was adopted:
That hereafter every person elected or appointed to any office of
honor or profit under the government of the United States, either in
47. See PAULEY. supra note 10, at 99.
48. LEVINSON, supra note 13, at 91.
49. 2 JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 304 (Gallard Hunt & James Brown
Scott eds., 1987).
50. Seeid.at 301-11.
51. Act of June 1, 1789, ch. I. 1 Stat. 23 (regulating the time and manner of
administering certain oaths).
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the civil, military or naval departments of the public service,
excepting the President of the United States, shall, before entering
upon the duties of such office, and before being entitled to any of the
salary or other emoluments thereof, take and subscribe the following
oath or affirmation: "i, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I
have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid,
countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in
armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted nor
attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever, under any
authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that
I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government,
authority, power or constitution with the United States, hostile or
inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best
of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitu-
tion of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and domestic;
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the
office on which I am about to enter, so help me God;" which said
oath, so taken and signed, shall be preserved among the files of the
court, House of Congress, or Department to which the said office
may appertain.52
This "Ironclad Test Oath" requirement as it became known was a high
hurdle for any former confederate to jump. Said Senator Trent Lott,
"Many of the oath's drafters specifically had in mind blocking the
return of one of my direct Senate predecessors-Jefferson Davis."" It
was even too much for one principled Democratic senator from
Delaware, a supporter of the Union, who resigned rather than take such
an oath, and he suffered accusations of disloyalty from Radical
Republicans. 4 Another senator, from Tennessee, David T. Patterson,
also had unquestioned loyalty to the Union, but had occupied one
minor government position in the Confederacy to protect his Unionist
neighbors. While the Republicans would accept him in the Senate, he
was pressured into perjuring himself with his oath of office in which he
swore he had never held any Confederate office rather than have the
Ironclad Oath be seen as ineffective in keeping out former Confederate
officeholders." Disputed elections resulted in congressional commit-
52. Act of June 5. 1862, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502 (prescribing oath of office).
53. 143 CONG. REC. S4-5 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1997).
54. See HYMAN. supra note 24. at 262.
55. See id. at 258-59.
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tees functioning as "loyalty review boards" in determining whether a
member-elect had been sufficiently loyal to take the Ironclad Oath.56
The Reconstruction emotion of the time is captured by a letter from a
Union army officer on duty in Arkansas:
My God--Can any sane man look at the men who fill the so-called
State Legislatures and then say that the [Southern] States are loyal?
Who are the men they send to Congress and then ask that you give
them seats? Majors, Colonels, and Generals of the rebel army from
whose foul hands we have just wrested the sword of rebellion. To
admit such men into the councils of the nation would disgrace every
soldier who fought in the late war and I for one would curse the day
I ever drew my sword in defence of such a Union."
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
ratified July 9, 1868.8 Section 3 addressed the problem of former
Confederates elected to the House and Senate and also affirmed once
again constitutional support for an oath of office for members of
Congress."
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer
of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as
an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitu-
tion of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House
remove such disability.'
On July I1, 1868, a new statute prescribed the oath of office to be taken
by former Confederates from whom the legal disability had been
removed by a vote of Congress, language that is identical to the oath
taken by members of Congress today.61  In 1871, a new statute set up
a more relaxed bifurcated oath of office in which former Confederates
recited the 1868 language, and those members who had never supported
56. See id. at 263.
57. Id. at 257 (quoting a letter from a Union army staff officer, posted in Arkansas,
to Thaddeus Stevens).
58. See William Morse and Stuart Myerurg, Constitution of the United States (visited
Apr. 5, 2001) <http://www.law.emory.edu/FEDERAL/usconst/amend.html# 14sec-5>.
59. See LEVINSON. supra note 13. at 92.
60. Se U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 3.
61. Act of July II. 1868, ch. 139, 15 Stat. 85.
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the Confederacy recited the Ironclad Oath.62 In 1884, the final revision
of the oath requirement occurred with the repeal of the Ironclad Oath,
and in the words of Hyman, "the nation took a long step forward on the
road to reunion. In their lifetimes the loyalty-testing laws reflected
little credit upon their defenders or their attackers, nor, history
indicates, did they have very much to do with loyalty."'63 The Congress
adopted the 1868 language for everyone elected to the House or Senate,
not just former supporters of the Confederacy; and it is this language
that is the current oath of office.'
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Article VI, Clause 3 includes language prohibiting any religious
test for holding office. The turmoil caused by such religious tests in
England provided weight against such tests in America, but Thomas
Grey carries this analysis a bit further:
The "but" suggests that the Framers considered the constitutional
oath a substitute for the religious tests the colonists were familiar
with under the English established church. To push the point a bit:
America would have no national church, as the First Amendment
later made explicit, yet the worship of the Constitution would serve
the unifying function of a national civil religion. 5
Levinson makes a similar point in his article Pledging Faith in the Civil
Religion; Or, Would You Sign the Constitution?66 This pledge of faith in
our basic document of government comes from the required oath of
office to support the Constitution and, like religious pledges of faith,
argues that such a formal statement of support ought not be taken
casually.
Perhaps of greater significance is the presence of the oath
requirement in the same Article containing the Supremacy Clause,
which clearly states federal law and the Constitution prevail in disputes
with state law or constitutions.67 During the Constitutional Convention,
62. See Act of Feb. 15, 1871, ch. 53, 16 Stat. 412 (repealed 1884).
63. HYMAN. supra note 24. at 265.
64. See Act of May 13, 1884. ch. 46, 23 Stat. 21: see also Imbrie v. Marsh. 71 A.2d
352, 365 (N.J. 1950).
65. Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. I (1984).
66. Sanford Levinson, Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion: Or, Would You Sign the
Constitution?, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 113, 120 (1987).
67. In Arkansas. elected officials take the following oath of office: "I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and
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the written record reflects the framers' perceived relationship between
the principle of the Supremacy Clause and the oath requirement.
Referring to the resolution that contained the oath requirement:
[Mr. Gerry] thought one good effect would be produced by it.
Hitherto the officers of the two Governments had considered them
as distinct from, and not as parts of the General System, and had in
all cases of interference given a preference to the State Gov'ts. The
proposed oath will cure that error.68
The Federalist Papers also demonstrate the close relationship between
the Supremacy Clause and the oath requirement. From Alexander
Hamilton:
It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the
confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its
jurisdiction, will become the Supreme Law of the land; to the
observance of which, all officers legislative, executive and judicial
in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath.6'
The meaning of this oath was tested by the 1830s debate in South
Carolina over nullification, a test that was the precursor of secession.
Federal tariff laws hurt the slave economy of agricultural states like
South Carolina. John Calhoun believed that states had the power to
reject federal law that the citizens of that state believed to be unjust, in
effect nullifying the federal law as applied to that state. South Carolina
passed a nullification statute and required state officials, except
legislators, to swear an oath to enforce it. The result was that pro-
Union South Carolinians could not hold office without swearing an
oath to support state actions over federal law and the United States
Constitution.7" This conflict was ultimately resolved by the Civil War,
but both sides used oaths of office in their pre-war battles, and the legal
skirmishes and rhetoric were training for future secessionist leaders
such as Calhoun."
Certainly the relationship between the Supremacy Clause and the
oath requirement should influence the office holder who reflects on the
the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties
of the office of , upon which I am now about to enter." ARK. CONST. art. IXX,
§ 20.
68. MADISON, supra note 49, at 256.
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 594 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bernard Bailyn ed.,
1993).
70. See HYMAN, supra note 24, at 118-19.
71. See id. at138.
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meaning of the oath of office; but "support" aims at the entire Constitu-
tion, not just the principles in the Supremacy Clause. Had support for
the Supremacy Clause been the sole intent of the oath of office, the
framers could have constructed the oath requirement to articulate that
more limited goal.
V. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
Pauley's book focuses on the meaning of the specific language
required by presidents on assuming office. "[T]he constitutionally
prescribed oath is indeed prescriptive: properly understood, it tells our
Presidents what they are obliged to do against the pressures that are
brought to bear on them from our society and from foreign regimes." '72
The congressional oath of office is not prescribed in the Constitution,
not even an admonition to faithfully discharge the duties of the office.
The simple articulation of the 1789 Congress, ", A.B., do solemnly
swear or affirm that I will support the Constitution of the United
States" is now replaced by words drafted during the bloody heat of the
Civil War, words drafted in a spirit of keeping the class of former
Confederates out of office. The words chosen reflect the wartime
environment: "to defend the Constitution of the United States against
all enemies, foreign and domestic." Part of Hyman's criticism of
loyalty oaths is that they "are crisis products. They emerge from the
felt needs of authorities during wars, rebellions, and periods of fear of
subversion.",7' The creation of this statutory oath of office occurred
during such a period, but does this resultant statutory oath encompass
the full meaning of the constitutional requirement "to support this
Constitution"? A general understanding of the word "support" includes
activities that sustain and nourish, a broader concept perhaps than
defending against enemies or of bearing "true faith and allegiance."
During the 1997 debate and votes on the many term limit amendment
proposals, there were no foreign or domestic enemies of the Constitu-
tion on the floor of the House advocating the various proposals; but
maybe more focus on the word "support" would have led to a conclu-
sion that a series of meaningless votes to amend our most revered
governmental document cannot do much to nurture our Constitution.
Judicial opinion might well conclude that words such as "faith" and
"allegiance" and concepts such as defending from enemies are
72. PAULEY, supra note 10, at 19.
73. HYMAN, supra note 24, at vii.
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essentially synonymous with "support"; but if the bulk of the positive
benefit of an oath of office for members of Congress comes from the
impression left by the formally repeated words, our Constitution would
do best if members recite the most supportive choice of words. The
current phraseology may have too much emphasis on enemies and not
enough on supportive nourishment.
VI. THE CONSCIENCE
Justice Douglas expressed the opinion that in America "the
domains of conscience and belief have been set aside and protected
from government intrusion" except for the Article VI oath requirement
mandating officials to swear they support the Constitution. 4 It is the
only place of thought control in the Constitution, and the Supreme
Court has upheld such mandated thinking as consistent with the First
Amendment, noting that it was the same men who approved both the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.' But swearing and believing are
different, and attempts to differentiate the two are always confusing, at
best unsatisfactory, and at times prejudicial. Richard Nixon said that
during the recitation of the Presidential oath, he was dedicating his
administration to the goal of world peace. Pauley asks, was Nixon's
interpretation of the oath in fact an expansion of the constitutional
duties of the Presidency?76  During the Bolshevism fears after World
War 1, Victor Berger was twice elected to the United States House from
Wisconsin as a Socialist; twice he was refused a seat in Congress
because the House voted to exclude him as being too disloyal to take
the oath of office. Berger was subsequently convicted of espionage-
related charges, but the House had in effect tried to read his mind
before the conviction. He never had the opportunity to take the oath of
office."
Julian Bond was elected to the Georgia legislature in June 1965.
At the time, the Vietnam War had begun to divide America, and Bond
had publicly expressed his opposition to the war. The Georgia
legislature refused to seat him, saying that his actions were inconsistent
with his oath to support the Constitution. The United States Supreme
Court disagreed, saying that the legislature does not have the authority
74. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 536 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
75. See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 682 (1972).
76. See PAULEY. supra note 10, at 23 1.
77. See HYMAN. supra note 24. at 319.
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to judge the sincerity of a member willing to take the oath, especially
when Bond had made no statements disavowing his belief in that oath.
Legislators do not lose their First Amendment rights at the House
door. 8 Like Berger, Bond was re-elected while the litigation pro-
gressed." Hamilton Long considers the thought control contained in
the oath requirement to be quite limited:
The oath provision of Article VI has nothing whatever to do
with--does not trespass upon-any freedom, or right, guaranteed by
the Constitution, as amended; it does not violate freedom to believe
or not believe in God, nor freedom of conscience, nor freedom of
thought, nor any other freedom. It merely expresses the sovereign
people's mandate as to one important condition, or qualifications
pertaining to the privilege (there is no right) of holding office, federal
or state.80
The challenge and hazards of judging sincerity is not new, nor is the
trap that sincere men fall into when they refuse for reasons of principle
to swear to words they may deem to be inappropriate. The Englishman
John Lilburne in 1647 expressed his dissatisfaction with oaths:
Oaths . . . now are nothing but cloaks of knavery, and breeders of
strife and mischief. Therefore for shame lay them all down and
press them no more upon any man whatsoever, for he that conscien-
tiously makes nothing of an oath, will make as little of breaking his
oath, whensoever it shall make for his profit, ease, or preferment,
whereas to him that conscientiously scruples an oath, his bare word
... is the sincerest tie in the world."'
VII. THE DUTY
Oaths of office, loyalty oaths, juror oaths, oaths on becoming a
member of the bar: all have some similarities. Certainly, formality is
one, the sense that the ceremony itself, the act of swearing conveys a
sense of importance and duty. But what is the duty contained within
a pledge to do as the Constitution mandates, "to support this Constitu-
tion"? An abundance of law from a variety of cases discusses the
burden that comes from swearing an oath. Two examples: the swearing
78. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132 (1966).
79. See id. at 117.
80. Hamilton A. Long, The Oath of Office, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1962.
81. HYMAN, supra note 24. at 23.
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party is "bound in conscience to perform the act faithfully and truly;,12
he may be bound "to act faithfully or speak truly."8 Other oaths have
special requirements, such as immigrants who must be "attached to the
principles of the Constitution."'" Joseph Story in his 1847 discussion
applies the principles gleaned from oaths in general to the congressio-
nal oath mandate:
That all those, who are intrusted with the execution of the powers of
the National Government, should be bound, by some solemn
obligation, to the due execution of the trusts reposed in them, and to
support the Constitution, would seem to be a proposition too clear,
to render any reasoning necessary in support of it. It results from the
plain right of society, to require some guarantee from every officer,
that he will be conscientious in the discharge of his duty. Oaths
have a solemn obligation upon the minds of all reflecting men, and
especially upon those, who feel a deep sense of accountability to a
Supreme being. If, in the ordinary administration of justice, in cases
of private rights, or personal claims, oaths are required of those, who
try the cause, as well as of those, who give testimony, to guard
against malice, falsehood and evasion, surely like guards ought to be
interposed in the administration of high public trusts, and especially
in such, as may concern the welfare and safety of the whole
community.8
Conscience and moral obligation permeate the older discussions of
oaths, and as Pauley says, the old American revolutionaries knew
honor and conscience.8 6 But duty to do what?
The Constitution is words, and words have meaning. In 1825,
Judge Gibson disagreed with the broad mandate that the Supreme
Court in Marbury v. Madison drew from the constitutional oath taken by
judges. He noted that many people take similar oaths including "a
recorder of deeds," and therefore the purpose of the oath must be a test
of the "political principles of the man," not a granting of a specific duty
with regard to the Constitution. What could a recorder of deeds have
to do with defense of the Constitution? 7 In Cole v. Richardson,s the
82. Greenwald v. State. 155 A.2d 894. 897 (Md. 1959).
83. In re Williamson. 43 B.R. 813. 821 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984).
84. LEVINSON. supra note 13, at 103. See also Levinson, supra note 17, at 1452.
85. PAULEY, supra note 10, at 225 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 252 (1847)).
86. See id. at 92.
87. See LEVINSON. supra note 13, at 121-23 (quoting Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. &
Rawle 330, 339. (Pa. 1825) (Gibson. J.. dissenting)).
88. 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
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United States Supreme Court discusses oath cases, and while express-
ing concern that vagueness in oaths may give the oath taker the false
impression that certain activities are prohibited, it goes on to say that
such is not the case with an admonition to support the Constitution.
One could make a literal argument that "support" involves nebulous,
undefined responsibilities for action in some hypothetical situations
S. .. We have rejected such rigidly literal notions and recognized
that the purpose leading legislatures to enact such oaths, just as the
purpose leading the Framers of our Constitution to include the two
explicit constitutional oaths, was not to create specific responsibili-
ties but to assure that those in positions of public trust were willing
to commit themselves to live by the constitutional processes of our
system."9
Further on, the Court refers to "support" as "simply a commitment to
abide by our constitutional system," although not surprisingly, at least
one court believes that part of such a definition of support may also be
to defend the laws.9 "Live by constitutional processes" and "abide by
our constitutional system:" how do those duties compare with the
Article II presidential oath? Pauley believes that the presidential oath
to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution" mandates the
President to be "bound in conscience to do nothing less than to save the
Union of the people of the United States (of which the Constitution is
the organic law) for those people, as a unique personal embodiment of
their united will."92  Perhaps comparing the somewhat minimalist
language of the Court in Cole on congressional oath responsibilities
with the expansive expressions of Pauley on the presidential oath
overstates the differences. Justice Thurgood Marshall bridged the gap
somewhat in one of the many cases involving state oaths for public
employment, in this case one that required the employee to "uphold
and defend" the state and federal constitutions. Said Marshall: "The
first half of the oath, requiring an employee to indicate a willingness to
'uphold and defend' the state and federal constitutions, is clearly
constitutional. It is nothing more than the traditional oath of support
that we have unanimously upheld as a condition of public employ-
ment." '93
89. Id. at 683-84.
90. Id. at 684.
91. See Huntamer v. Coe. 246 P.2d 489, 494 (Wash. 1952) (en banc).
92. PAULEY, supra note 10, at 185.
93. Cole, 405 U.S. at 692 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Ought a duty to support the Constitution, to abide by the constitu-
tional processes, affect a legislator's consideration of proposed
legislation that may be unconstitutional? Certainly some judges think
it should. Justice Scalia, for example: "The Louisiana legislators who
passed the 'Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-
Science Act,' . . . each of whom had sworn to support the Constitution,
were well aware of the potential Establishment Clause problems and
considered that aspect of the legislation with great care." 4 In fact, in
a footnote he cites the Article VI, Clause 3 obligation that state
legislators have to support the Constitution." Justice Souter expresses
a similar view also in a dissenting opinion: "Indeed, Members of
Congress must take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution,
and we should presume in every case that Congress believed its statute
to be consistent with the constitutional commands."' , How far can this
line of reasoning extend? In a 1944 New York case, a court rejected
the view that it must follow the precedent of a United States Supreme
Court opinion:
Article 6 of the Federal Constitution requires that all members of the
Legislature and all executive and judicial officers of the several
states shall take an oath to support that Constitution. It does not
require an oath to support an act of Congress or any law promul-
gated by any Federal official or any Court decision. The Constitu-
tion alone, as it is written, is the sole test."1
While one can argue that this viewpoint may not be consistent with
abiding by the constitutional process, President Andrew Jackson
expressed a similar view in his veto message of July 10, 1832, in which
he explained his veto of a bill the Supreme Court had already upheld:
Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution
swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is
understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of
Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon
the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented
to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when
it may be brought before them for judicial decision. The opinion of
the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of
94. Edwards v. Aguillard. 482 U.S. 578, 610 (1987) (Scalia. J., dissenting).
95. Seeid. atn.I.
96. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley. 524 U.S. 569. 604 n.3 (1998)
(Souter. J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
97. Wuebker v. James. 58 N.Y.S.2d 671, 677 (Schenectady County Ct. 1944).
916 [Vol. 23
CONGRESSIONAL OATH OF OFFICE
Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is
independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not,
therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive
when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such
influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve."
Levinson, in his book Constitutional Faith, discusses the problems with
such a duty on legislators:
A conscientious legislator, for example, might well have an
independent duty to measure suggested legislation against his or her
thought-out conception of the Constitution and, albeit reluctantly,
reject those bills which do not pass muster. Such a belief in
conscientiousness, wherever found, rests on several assumptions, not
the least being that the Constitution can be sufficiently "decoded" to
provide firm guidance to the political officials who have solemnly
agreed to obey it. Practically speaking, though, few treat the
Constitution as having an easily knowable, fixed identity."
In my experience as both a state senator and member of Congress,
legislators are sensitive to constitutional problems in proposed
legislation, but we are not judges: there is no case and controversy;
there will be no formal hearing and presentation of argument; and most
of us are not lawyers. The duty to sort out the constitutional from the
unconstitutional is recognized by many legislators as part of our
obligation to "support this Constitution," but the duty of legislators
voting on bills is obviously different from the duty ofjudges.
VIII. THE ARTICLE V QUESTION
What does it mean to "support this Constitution" when Article V
provides a mechanism for it to be changed? Does the oath mean that
members of Congress should oppose all amendments? The framers did
not think so. From the records of the Constitutional Convention:
Mr. Ghorum did not know that oaths would be of much use; but
could see no inconsistency between them and . . . any regular
amend't of the Constitution. The oath could only require fidelity to
the existing Constitution. A constitutional alteration of the Constitu-
98. American Heritage Library, Internet Brigade, President Andrew Jackson s Veto
of the Bank of the United States, July 10, 1832 (visited Apr. 5, 2001) <http://www.
buchanan.org/h-1 76.html>: see also PAULEY, supra note 10, at 173.
99. LEVINSON. supra note 13. at 123-24.
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tion, could never be regarded as a breach of the Constitution, or of
any oath to support it.'"
Washington listed as one reason for supporting the Constitution that a
mechanism exists for changing it.'"' Pre-Civil War members opposed
to slavery took the oath knowing that the Constitution recognized
slavery, yet many desired that slavery end.'0 2 In fact, many members
of Congress take the oath to support the Constitution simultaneously
believing that our country would benefit from a constitutional change.
I am one of those. Perhaps I am influenced by my niece, who was
adopted from overseas when she was an infant, but I believe the
prohibition against naturalized citizens becoming President no longer
serves a useful purpose and probably causes some harm to the hopes
and dreams of thousands of our youngsters.
In a symposium entitled Constitutional Stupidities, several legal
authorities were asked to briefly describe the part of the Constitution
deemed to be the most imperfect. In Mark Tushnet's piece entitled The
Whole Thing, he expressed concern that perhaps "the basic structure of
our national government may be unsuitable for contemporary society,"
and suggested that perhaps we should look at a parliamentary system.'0 3
Yet throughout this writing, one senses respect and "support" for the
Constitutional process. Levinson points out that it would trivialize the
oath if a member completely opposed to the American Constitution
could take the oath in good faith merely by recognizing that through
Article V it can be changed." 4  There is one intriguing theory,
fortunately as yet untested, that a ratified amendment could in fact be
struck down as unconstitutional, the idea being that an amendment
could be so dramatically in conflict with our constitutional democracy
that the United States Supreme Court ought to strike it down."5 Could
the oath of support be for that portion of the Constitution that would
not and should not ever be changed, a tricky determination for 435
excited members holding babies waiting for a Speaker to be elected?
Another perspective: perhaps supporting the core values contained in
our Constitution means sometimes recognizing the need to amend it.
I would argue that adopted children naturalized as American citizens
ought to have the same right to run for the Presidency as any native-
100. MADISON. supra note 49, at 304; see also PAULEY, supra note 10, at 114.
101. See PAULEY. supra note 10. at 114.
102. See LEVINSON. supra note 13, at 65, 139.
103. Mark Tushnet. The Whole Thing, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 223, 224 (1995).
104. See LEVINSON. supra note 13, at 138.
105. See id. at 150.
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born American, and that such language in our Constitution would be
reflective of our American democratic heritage guaranteed by the
Constitution. Such a change would be a healthy nurturing of our most
fundamental document, a show of "support [for] this Constitution."
However, perhaps most advocates of the 10,000 amendments that have
been proposed over the life of the Constitution share the same
sentiment.
IX. THE SACRED OBLIGATION
In his last days, Andrew Johnson expressed his intent to be buried
with a copy of the Constitution beneath his head.'" Such professions
of profound respect for our founding document and the duties con-
tained therein may seem quaint now, but are not inconsistent with the
views of others in our American past. George Washington, for
example, believed that "the Constitution which at any time exists till
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people is sacredly
obligatory upon all."'" 7 Justice Story's comments previously noted also
used the phrase "sacred obligation" when referring to support for the
Constitution and the duties of the office.'0 8 Washington's admonition
that "the Constitution .. .be sacredly maintained," as well as Madi-
son's belief in "veneration" of the Constitution by the citizenry are both
cited by Levinson in his article Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion; Or,
Would You Sign the Constitution?'"9 Levinson concludes that making a
decision as a modern-day American to sign the Constitution is a
* "commitment to taking political conversation seriously ... I do indeed
believe that the Constitution is best understood as supportive of such
conversations and of government predicated on respect for their
maintenance.""'  One cautionary note: such seriousness toward these
Constitutional obligations can be used as a divisive wedge. During
Reconstruction, both Democrats and Republicans used charges of
disloyalty to hurt the opportunity for newly elected members of
Congress to be seated,"' essentially accusing an individual of not
fulfilling, in Washington's words, the sacred obligation.
106. See PAULEY. supra note 10, at 181.
107. Id. at 115 (quoting Washington).
108. 1d. at 225.
109. See Levinson. supra note 66, at 115.
110. Id. at 144.
IIl. See HYMAN, supra note 24. at 263.
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X. THE OATH AND ETIQUETTE
The House vote on the articles of impeachment at the end of 1999
and the subsequent Senate vote on the future of the Presidency of Bill
Clinton generated much serious discussion in Congress. It was
common to hear members publicly and privately talk of the gravity of
the vote and the role that conscience plays in such votes. It was indeed
a serious time, but what about other times? What role should the oath
play, if any, in the day-to-day job of legislating? What might we do to
enhance the opportunity for the oath requirement to produce what
Levinson called "serious political conversation"? What follows are
some suggestions offered in the spirit of "support for this Constitution."
These suggestions are not meant to be legalisms or rules but instead
more of an etiquette that enhances respect both for the document but
also for members and candidates, often in disagreement on important
issues, working to do the best job they can of supporting our Constitu-
tion.
First, after election but before the beginning of the new Congress,
a formal orientation is held for new members. Several think-tanks also
put on issues conferences. A formal discussion of the oath, its history,
and what it means to members would be a worthwhile topic. Most of
orientation week for House members is partisan in that each party puts
on the program for its respective new members, but a discussion of the
oath would be an opportunity for an additional bipartisan event. In my
experience, some of the best interpersonal relationship building occurs
at small dinners hosted by senior members. Similar informal discus-
sions, with new and old members of both parties, following the formal
tutorial on the oath, could be helpful in encouraging members to learn
from each other what "veneration" of the Constitution means in the
reality of a pressured political life.
Second, in the House, all 435 members are sworn in simulta-
neously. The numbers are too large to do small groups as the Senate
does; but the good that comes from the formality of the oath might be
augmented in the House by a brief historical discussion similar to what
Senator Lott has done on the floor of the Senate.
Third, the wording of the current oath is a product of the most
divisive period in the history of our country, the Civil War. The history
of the adoption of this language is consistent with the production of
what Hyman called a "crisis product.""' 2 The Congress should consider
112. See HYMAN. supra note 24, at vii.
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a return to the very straightforward language first adopted in 1789 that
endured until the Civil War, and had as its only obligation the one
contained in Article VI, Clause 3, to support the Constitution.
Fourth, probably no debate warrants more serious political
conversation than that discussion which occurs in considering
amendments to the Constitution. The framers desired veneration of the
Constitution, but they also expected amendments to it. They wanted
the oath of support for the Constitution to encompass pledging faith to
a document that would change. As part of etiquette consistent with
serious political conversation on proposed amendments, the debates
ought not be politicized; but what does that mean when what one
member dismisses as politicization another may consider sound tactic?
Here are some possibilities for consideration. Members and candidates
should exercise caution in stating a position of support for a proposed
amendment until they have all the information and opinion they need.
The midst of a heated campaign is an incredibly rushed and haphazard
time to formalize a position on an issue as complicated as supporting
an amendment to the Constitution, yet there can be much pressure to
do so. Voters and advocacy groups should be respectful of members
and candidates who demonstrate reluctance to support amendments, an
attitude that can be difficult if the member changed his or her mind
from a previous posture of support for the amendment. For example,
one opinion writer referred to Senators Robert Byrd and Richard
Bryan's change of mind regarding previous support for a flag desecra-
tion amendment as having "turned their backs on Old Glory.""' 3
Senator Byrd's statement, "Why I voted against flag amendment"
seems to demonstrate heartfelt support for and veneration of the
Constitution when he concludes:
I believe in this Constitution deeply. That flag is the symbol of our
nation. That flag is the symbol of our nation's history. That flag is
the symbol of our nation's values. We love that flag. It symbolizes
the nation. But we must love the Constitution more. It is not just a
symbol; it is the thing itself."4
Another recent example: should voters judge a member who has a
change of heart regarding previous support for a term limits amend-
113. Alan W. Dowd, Washington Wake-up Call, AMERICAN LEGION MAG., June 2000
(last updated May 29, 2001). available at <http://www.legion.org/pubs/2000/wake
6f.htm>.
114. Robert C. Byrd, Why I Voted Against Flag Amendment. BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31,
2000, at A 19.
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ment differently than they would a member who changes his or her
mind regarding a personal pledge to serve no more than three or four
terms? Etiquette consistent with veneration of the Constitution argues
that the two decisions warrant different treatment.
In the past, political leaders in the two major parties reached
informal agreements not to give financial support to challengers who
attack incumbents for their support of a congressional pay raise,
believing that such a vote ought not be politicized. And candidates and
members for the most part avoid attacking each other for job related
foreign travel because in our complicated modem world it is not
helpful to have decision-makers without personal exposure to the
world's international problems. It would be consistent with "support
for this Constitution" to have some kind of similar respect for the
reluctance of challengers and incumbents to change the Constitution
even though their electoral defeat might be a much sought-after goal.
On the other hand, proposed amendments are important to their
advocates and are fair game for politics, including elections, but the
quality of the debate would perhaps be elevated by remembering the
framers' intent to have legislators bound very seriously to the Constitu-
tion.
Positions in support of amending the Constitution are probably
best not formed by the sometimes surprisingly strong winds of political
pressure. Former Senator Dale Bumpers told me that one of his
favorite senatorial tasks was to go back home to Arkansas and talk to
his constituents about why he voted the way he did, and he used his
opposition to a flag desecration amendment as the example. He
compared changing the words of the Constitution and the First
Amendment to changing the words of the Bible: neither appealed to
him. Perhaps pledging faith to the Constitution means sometimes
having that kind of potentially difficult conversation with constituents
when a proposed amendment appears to have popular support, but the
member concludes that it is wrong for America and the Constitution.
Fifth, committee treatment, the rules of the debate, and all similar
procedural considerations ought to be supportive of the Constitution.
It is my opinion that the rules of the debate which brought to the floor
of the House nine different versions of a term limits amendment, all
with meager support, may have been more respectful of potential
political problems back home for some members than they were of our
most basic document. Veneration of the Constitution ought to occur at
all stages of the process, not just in the formulation of each member's
individual vote.
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Finally, we must not forget history. Hyman in great detail
articulated the hazards befalling societies that attempt to enforce
loyalty oaths. My musings are offered as support for an atmosphere of
respect for those elected officials for whom the oath of office is a
source of motivation for upgrading the level of political discourse,
especially a decision on a proposed amendment. All members of
Congress and the public have every right to support any amendment or
issue they choose, and it would be disappointing if at some point in our
nation's history increased focus on the oath of office produced caustic
and politically inspired accusations of disloyalty and failure to uphold
the oath. Efforts in the past to judge the sincerity of oath-takers have
been problematic and should not be pursued. Application of similar
energy to judge oneself against a constitutional standard can be just as
difficult,"' but such personal effort is itself consistent with an oath to
"support this Constitution."
Xl. CONCLUSION
All American legislators, state and federal, formally pledge
support to the Constitution as they embark on a public life of excite-
ment, frustration, success, failure, fast pace, long days, and tough
challenges. Remembering the excitement of those first few minutes as
an elected official is easy; the meaning of the oath and its potential
impact on the significant decisions of a legislator are more difficult to
determine. This discussion has attempted to pull together some of the
history, court cases, and commentary on the Article VI, Clause 3 oath
requirement. Perhaps for some it might be an aid to the public and
.personal commitment, the "sacred obligation," to support the Constitu-
tion.
115. See LEVINSON. supra note 13, at 123.
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